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Human Errors: A Taxonomy for Describing Human
Malfunction in Industrial Installations1
Jens Rasmussen
Abstract: This paper describes the definition and the characteristics of human error.
Different types of human behavior are classified, and their relation to different error
mechanisms are analyzed. The effect of conditioning factors related to affective,
motivating aspects of the work situation as well as physiological factors are also taken
into consideration. The taxonomy for event analysis, including human malfunction, is
presented. Possibilities for the prediction of human error are discussed. The need for
careful studies in actual work situations is expressed. Such studies could provide a better
understanding of the complexity of human error situations as well as the data needed to
characterize these situations.
INTRODUCTION
At present we witness a large interest in the involvement of human op-
erators in the reliability and safety of industrial installations as well as
in methods for incorporation of the effects of human errors in quanti-
tative risk assessment. Two features of the present situation are par-
ticularly important when considering the development of quantitative
methods: One is the need to consider the human role in rare events due
to the risk involved in large scale industrial installations. Another one is
the introduction of interface equipment based on the rapidly developing
information technology. Together these features lead to a pronounced
need for replacement of empirical design guides by tools and methods
for analytical human performance prediction and error probability
estimation.
Analytical techniques are based on a causal model of the role of parts
and components of a system in the accidental chains of events leading
from the initial fault or disturbance to the unacceptable consequences.
Until recently, most analytical effort for including human errors has
been spent on verification of the safety of existing, operating process
plants of traditional design with respect to the man-machine interface,
as for instance, the use of Therp (Swain 1976) on nuclear power plants
(WASH 1400). This situation has led to a definition of errors and
quantification of error rates in terms referring to the structure and
elements of the external human task, and not in terms of human
functions and capabilities and their limitations. Generally, current
methods are based on a taxonomy of human errors in terms of erro-
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2neous sequencing or performance of task elements or steps; i.e., the
analytical approach is based on a model of the task rather than a model
of the man performing the task. Human functions and features are then
taken into consideration by means of "performance shaping factors"
(Swain 1976, 1980).
Unfortunately this means that only little guidance for predicting
human performance with new designs of man-machine interfaces can
be derived. To be able to collect empirical data for human performance
for transfer to another task context than the one supplying the data, a
generic psychological classification of human errors must be applied
which has well specified relations to generic task properties and envi-
ronmental features.
Only little is published on such generic psychological error mecha-
nisms, probably because human errors have been considered to be a
weakness of operators which could be cured by improved training and
better instructions and because the pace of change of work situations
has been slow enough to allow for purely empirical methods. Typically,
some of the early attempts to find generic psychological error mecha-
nisms from analysis of professional task performance are from aviation
research to improve cockpit designs see for instance Fitts and Jones
(1947). Theoretical studies of psychological error mechanisms have only
started quite recently. James Reason (1975, 76, 79) has published
analysis of human errors based on explicit models of human
performance and has made attempts to sketch a taxonomy of error
mechanisms from the analysis of "every day slips and lapses".
Based on analysis of event reports from nuclear power plants an at-
tempt has been made to characterize human error mechanisms in
generic terms (Rasmussen 1980) and the results of this analysis have
been adopted in a proposal for a taxonomy for practical data collection
by an OECD/CSNI group of experts (Rasmussen et al. 1981). Recently,
also Norman (1979, 80) has published analysis of every day "slips of
mind" including initial attempts to develop more generic classification
schemes for description of human errors. However, before discussing a
taxonomy of human errors, it will be necessary to consider a definition
of human errors in more detail.
DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN ERRORS
Basically it is very difficult to give a satisfactory definition of human
errors. Frequently they are identified after the fact: If a system performs
less satisfactorily than it normally does due to a human act or to a dis-
turbance which could have been counteracted by a reasonable human
act the cause will very likely be identified as a human error. This is
3probably because the analyst will not have the information or psycho-
logical background which is necessary to trace through the human
performance in the explanatory causal backtracking process to find a
possible causal input (see Rasmussen 1980).
A more fruitful point of view is to consider human errors as instances
of man-machine or man-task misfits. In case of systematic or frequent
misfits, the cause will typically be considered to be a design error.
Occasional misfits are typically caused by variability on part of the
system or the man and are considered to be system failures or human
errors, respectively.
However, human variability is an important ingredient in adaptation
and learning and the ability to adapt to peculiarities in system perfor-
mance and optimize interaction is the very reason for having people in a
system. To optimize performance, to develop smooth and efficient skills,
it is very important to have opportunities to perform trial and error
experiments, and human errors can in a way be considered as un-
successful experiments with unacceptable consequences. Typically they
are only classified as human errors because they are performed in an
"unkind" work environment. An unkind work environment is then de-
fined by the fact that it is not possible for a man to observe and reverse
the effects of inappropriate variations in performance before they lead to
unacceptable consequences.
When the effect of human variability is observable and reversible, the
definition of error is related to a reference or norm in terms of the suc-
cessful outcome of the activity. However, if observability and/or re-
versibility of inappropriate performance are not present; if, for instance,
the effect of errors is delayed in time, is depending on further steps in a
sequence, or is dependent upon possible latent conditions, as is often
the case in industrial installations, then an established successful pro-
cedure becomes the man's only immediate reference for a judgment of
errors, which therefore are related to the activity per se, rather than to
a fulfillment of the related goal.
In practice it will be very difficult to arrange data collection related to
those human errors which are immediately observable and reversible by
the acting person and, therefore, may be corrected without further no-
tice. In particular, it will be very difficult to determine the frequency of
opportunities for such errors which will be needed to derive error rates
or probabilities of error in a specific situation.
The features of observability and reversibility vary with error types
and with task context and depend on very specific and detailed charac-
teristics of the interface. Consequently, different task settings will be
potential sources of data for the various error types. In order to transfer
error data to predict performance in a new task design, it is necessary
4to have a match between observability and reversibility features of the
new task and those used as data sources for each of the various rele-
vant error mechanisms. It is, therefore, necessary to identify and char-
acterize the features of a task which prevent error reversal during the
analyzed events and which, during data collection, will act as a selective
filter upon the initial repertoire of errors committed. This should
probably not be part of the event analysis itself but be performed as a
background task analysis for the work situations included in the data
collection.
The analytical problems depend very much on the nature  of the
work situation. In process plant control, for instance, the work
situation is highly structured and the effects of human errors can be
analyzed. However, due to the processes which are not immediately
visible, the recovery problem is rather complex. In general work safety,
the work situation is very unstructured, which causes analytical
problems; on the other hand, the "processes" are typically rather
concrete and visible, and recovery features can be more readily defined.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND ERROR MECHANISMS
By analytical systems assessment, the consequences and probabilities
of accidental chains of events are predicted from a causal model based
on knowledge of failure modes of the components of the system and the
related failure rates. To facilitate systematic analysis, a library of "mini-
fault-trees" for standard components is generally used. Probabilities for
the failure modes related to different branches of the tree are typically
conditioned by operating and environmental parameters. The basic idea
is that the components can be represented by an input-output model
with known transfer functions for the various failure modes. Similarly,
human system "components" have been represented by input-output
models with transfer characteristics which can be modified by error
mechanisms (see fig. 1).
Already from the above discussion of the definition of human errors, it
appears that this model is unrealistic since it does not take into con-
sideration the selective filtering of error mechanisms depending upon
reversibility features of the task context. Furthermore, the model lacks
the aspect of human intention and expectancy; in reality, there is no
one-to-one relationship between the external task performance and the
internal human functions which are used. This relationship depends on
human value perception and upon subjective goals and performance
criteria derived from such values. From the subjective goals and the ex-
pectations about the state of the system, information is sought and
collected actively. Trained people ask questions to the system, biased by
5their experience and immediate expectations; they do not passively re-
ceive and filter an information input (see fig. 2).
TRANSFER
FUNCTION
Input Output
PERCEPTION MEDIATION MOTORFUNCTIOS
OutputInput
Characterized by:  - Failure Modes and probabilities
                             - Environmental factors
Characterized by:  - Error modes and probabilities
                             - Performance shaping factors
PHYSICAL COMPONENT
HUMAN OPERATOR
Figure 1. Schematic diagram illustrating input-output response model of a physical
component used for failure analysis and the analog model frequently adopted for hu-
man operators.
PERCEPTION MEDIATION MOTORFUNCTIOS
OutputInformation
VALUE
PERCEPTION
Subjective goals,
intentions, performance
criteria, expectations
Figure 2. Model of a human operator must include active intentions, expectations,
and subjective goals.
It follows that error mechanisms and failure modes depend on mental
functions and knowledge which are activated by subjective factors.
They cannot be directly observed but must be inferred from
characteristics of the task and the work situation together with the
external manifestation of the error. For this to be possible, a model of
human information processing must be available. Such a model must
relate elements of human decision making and action to internal
information processes for which generic psychological mechanisms and
limitations can be identified. An attempt to develop such a model from
analysis of verbal protocols and cases of human malfunction has been
described elsewhere (Rasmussen 1976, 80).
In this model, a distinction is drawn between three levels of behavior:
skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based performance, see fig. 3. This distinc-
tion is tightly related to the norm or reference used for error judgment,
since different concepts are used to control behavior: In the skill-based
6domain, including automated, more or less subconscious routines,
performance is controlled by stored patterns of behavior in a time-space
domain. Errors are related to variability of force, space or time coordi-
nation. The rule-based domain includes performance in familiar situa-
tions controlled by stored rules for coordination of subroutines, and er-
rors are typically related to mechanisms like wrong classification or
recognition of situations, erroneous associations to tasks, or to memory
slips in recall of procedures. Since rule-based behavior is used to
control skill-based subroutines, the error mechanisms related to skill-
based routines are always active. Rule-based behavior is not directly
goal-controlled, but goal oriented, and the immediate criteria for errors
deal with whether the relevant rules are recalled and followed correctly
or not. This is the case, unless the total task is considered explicitly as
one integrated whole and ultimate error correction is included in the
error definition. However, in that case, transfer of data to and from a
different task context is not possible.
The third behavioral domain is called upon in case of unique, un-
familiar situations for which actions must be planned from an analysis
and decision based on knowledge of the functional, physical properties
of the system and the priority of the various goals. In this domain, the
internal data processing functions used for the task are very person
and situation dependent and vary with details in the task context, with
the extent and type of knowledge immediately available to the person,
and with his subjective preferences. In general, errors in this domain
can only be defined in relation to the goal of the task and generic error
mechanisms can only be defined from very detailed studies based on
verbal protocols which can supply data on the actual data process.
Data collection and prediction based on a breakdown of task perfor-
mance in the knowledge-based domain is only possible for very tightly
controlled experimental situations, not for real-life task settings
(Rasmussen 1980). Consequently, the present taxonomy only includes
inappropriate reading of input information together with errors of infer-
ence leading to unsuccessful performance due to latent, not considered,
conditions or to unacceptable side effects. Both are failures in func-
tional reasoning about a causal network.
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8An important set of error mechanisms is related to failure in selecting
the proper level of behavior in an abnormal situation, here called errors
of discrimination. These error mechanisms are consequences of the fact
that data in the environment cannot be considered input information to
a passive data processor. In the three levels of behavior, a man uses
basically different information which is derived from the data, viz.
information in the form of signals, signs, or symbols (Rasmussen 1980).
Which interpretation he uses depends on an active choice and error
mechanisms are related to his bias or fixation for this choice.
Fig. 3 illustrates the characteristic data processes of the three levels.
Clearly, the mental processes and the related error mechanisms are
different for the various levels. The level applied in a given situation de-
pends strongly upon the degree of training of the operator, and it is
seen that error data collected from routine task situations are not ap-
plicable in unfamiliar, infrequent situations (such as emergencies) irre-
spective of the effects of stress and similar factors. In passing it can be
mentioned that "tunnel vision" during emergency situations can be the
effect not only of stress, but can be caused by the fundamental nature
of the diagnostic task (cognitive tunneling, Moray 1981) and of the ca-
pacity requirements of higher level mental tasks (Rasmussen 1981).
The generic mental functions at the three levels of behavior as illus-
trated in the schematic diagram of fig. 3 must be related to a more gen-
eral description of that internal mental function which was not per-
formed as required by the external task. In order to be able to identify
the internal function which failed on the basis of the external effects of
errors alone, this description must be independent on the level of hu-
man behavior and based alone on a rational breakdown of the decision
sequence into the phases of detection, identification, decision, etc., as
indicated on top of fig. 3.
So far we have considered only what went wrong (the internal mental
function that failed) and how it went wrong (the internal failure mech-
anism) together with the effect upon the external task, the external
mode of malfunction. It is necessary also to consider explicitly the
cause of the malfunction, why it happened, especially whether the
change in the work is ascribed the role of cause, is related to sponta-
neous human variability or is a change in the external work condition,
in the  form of a change in task content or an irrelevant, distracting
event. In conclusion, these factors add up to a description of a  human
error in the form of a causal chain of events as shown  in fig. 4.
How far back in this chain one needs to go to identify the category to
be selected as the nominal cause for which  data is collected depends
upon the actual use. To judge reliability of an existing task, it is only
necessary to consider the external mode of failure; to judge training and
9interface design for improvement, the mechanism of failure must be
considered; and to evaluate the work situation, the external causes
must also be identified.
INTERNAL MENTAL
FUNCTIONS FAILEDEXTERNAL CAUSES
INTERNAL FAILURE
MECHANISMS
EXTERNAL MODE OF
ACTION FAILURES
Requirements for
mental functions
Specified action
sequence
EXTERNAL TASK
Figure 4. Typical characteristics of an accidental chain of events including human
malfunction.
Fig. 4 include five aspects of human errors which are useful as five di-
mensions in a multi-facet classification system. These dimensions are
not completely independent, significant correlation is found for subsets
of tasks and work situations. Furthermore, the members of the different
categories are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, generic fault trees
or prototypical decision-error-trees are not feasible to characterize
human performance. We prefer the use of a multi-facet description from
which error-trees can be derived for specific applications, as described
later. This solution also seems to be preferable for computer adminis-
tration and analysis of data since a good resolution can be obtained
with a limited number of classes in each dimension.
PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS
The causal chain of events of fig. 4 only considers the information pro-
cessing aspects of the man-machine interaction; i.e., the chain of events
related to changes in the conditions for human decisions or to the
process of decision making itself. However, the work environment
influences man in a much more complex way than through the infor-
mation domain alone, as illustrated by fig. 5. It appears to be necessary
to include conditioning factors related to affective, motivating aspects of
the work situation as well as physiological factors. Such factors will not
directly appear in the causal chain of events but may influence it by
changing human limits of capability, subjective preferences in choice of
mental strategies and goals etc. Some of these factors can only be
identified by careful analysis of the actual work "climate" and are fre-
quently not considered in normal event reports. Together with the cate-
gories of fig. 5, such conditioning factors result in the taxonomy of
human errors illustrated by fig. 6.
1
0
Mental information
processing
Subjective value
formation
Anthropometrics
Physiological
functions
Cognitive and affective
Psychological mechanisms
Criteira and
preferences
Inappropriate
intention
Mental
resources
Inadequate
resources
Arousal
fatigue Stress
Physical
capability Disablement
HUMAN OPERATOR FUNCTIO
Situation, policy
Attifude and value features
Symbolic information
data, orders, etc.
Emotional, affective
situation features
Physiological
stressors
Physical work load
injuries
Social climate,
management style
Inaccurate, inadequate
information
Distractions, motivatonal
factors, boredom
Inappropriate climate
(heat, noise)
Shift patterns
Work safety
INFLUENCE FROM
ENVIRONMENT
Figure 5 illustrates the complex interactions in a man-machine system which control
the mis-match found in an error situation.
THE TAXONOMY FOR EVENT ANALYSIS INCLUDING HUMAN
MALFUNCTION
The categories of the taxonomy directly related to the inappropriate
human performance are shown on fig. 6. When used for data collection
in process plant environments, a number of categories are added for de-
scription of the circumstances for the event, including characteristics of
the process plant and its immediate operational state; the manner of
detection of the event; the ultimate consequences upon plant operation;
the systems and components affected; the personnel category involved;
the work location; etc. These categories are discussed in more detail in
Rasmussen et al. 1981.
When used for data collection, a number of conventions are needed
to avoid too much ambiguity and guidelines for event analysis should
be used for consistent classification. Guidelines are proposed elsewhere
(Hollnagel et al. 1981) and examples are given in the following discus-
sion of the categories, which is ordered according to the logical se-
1
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quence of analysis. It will be clear from the discussion that the impor-
tant feature of the taxonomy proposed will be the structure and its di-
mensions, not the detailed numbers of categories, which may vary with
the specific application.
External cause,
antecedent
events:
-  Changes in goals
      and work
      requirements
- Faults in tools
     and equipment
-  Distraction by
      co-worker
-  Conflicting or
      competing
      requirements
Psychological
mechanism
activated:
Knowledge Based:
- Linear thought
        in causal net
- Inadequate
         information
         or knowledge
Rule Based:
- Underspecified
         action
- Omission of
         isolated act
- Mistake of
         alternatives
Skill Based:
- Inadequate
   Spatial-temporal
              precision
- Capture by over-
   learned routine
Decision
function
involved:
Situation
         analysis:
-  Observation
-  Identification
Decision:
-  Prediction
-  Goal
evaluation
-  Choice of
target
Planning:
- Task selection
-   Procedure
          planning
Execution:
-  Coordination.
-  Monitoring
       of actions
Overt acts
affected
Huge variety
of distorted
task sequence
elements
described in
work domain
terms
Consequences
for system
operation
Goals or
targets
missed
or
Obnoxious
extraneous
effects:
Uncontrolled
release of
energy or
hazardous
substances;
Death, etc.
Task requirements:
Work procedure for
particular work
situation and task
Functional system
Properties:
Causal, relational
network of work
environment
Behavior shaping factors
in work environment:
- Stress factors
- Social factors
- Workload
- Level of training
- Shift-work, etc.
Figure 6. Multi-facet taxonomy for description and analysis of events involving human
malfunction
Personnel Task
Identification of the task performed is important to characterize the
circumstances during which the malfunction occurred. The categories
included in fig. 7 are rather general and only useful for routine event
reporting. In proper data collection campaigns, the tasks involved must
be analyzed and the location of the failure in the task more precisely
identified. Furthermore, task analysis must be performed to determine
the bias resulting from the potential for immediate error correction to-
gether with the frequency of error opportunities.
External Mode of Malfunction
This category describes the immediate, observable effect of human
malfunction upon the task performance and the way in which it initi-
ates the consequent chain of accidental events. The category serves to
characterize the sensitivity of the system to the malfunction in a few
classes which are useful for monitoring a plant system by routine re-
ports and which relates to the information needed in reliability analysis
(whether the specified task is performed) and for risk analysis (effects of
erroneous acts). For predictive analysis, the classes are not very useful
and more specific external modes should be determined from a correla-
tion of error mechanisms, internal functions and the result of a task
analysis as described below.
1
2
Internal Human Malfunction
This category identifies the internal mental function of the man's deci-
sion making which was not performed as required by the task. It is
based upon a model of human decision making as a rational sequence
of elements as indicated in fig. 3, which may be performed as stated or
by-passed by habitual leaps. Event analysis should serve to identify the
decision process that has been erroneously performed or has been
inappropriately by-passed by a habitual leap.
The use of these decision categories is ambiguous in several ways
and some conventions are necessary to give consistent classifications.
First of all, human performance has basically a hierarchical-structure
and it may consequently be a matter of choice as to which level the
decision categories are used and how they are brought into use. This
choice will depend on the circumstances during which inappropriate
human performance is found and on the amount and quality of the
information available from the event. One typical example will be a
skilled operator making a single erroneous decision during normal or
near-normal work situations. In this case, the decision categories will
be used on a high level of task planning, partly because highly
professional people are only making "decisions" at a high level to control
their skilled and more subconscious routines as illustrated in fig. 3,
and partly because routine event reports do not include information
which enables an identification of decision errors at a lower level, even
though they may appear; e.g., if a skilled routine must be modified. A
repair task can be taken as an example: If the equipment fault is
incorrectly diagnosed, the inappropriate mental function is classified as
"identification". However, if the fault is correctly identified and the task
of replacement properly mentioned but inappropriately planned
because the internal state of the equipment is not properly identified at
a lower level, then the mental malfunction will be classified as
"inappropriate procedure".
1
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ERRONEOUS DECISION FUNCTION: WHAT FAILED?
Does operator  realize need 
for activity?
Call for operator intervention
Is the  activity related to the 
present functional state of 
the system
Does the operator adopt an 
overall goal which 
corresponds to plant policy?
Does the state into which 
operator intends to bring 
system comply with his goal  
and present system state?
Will the task the operator  
performs bring the system 
to the intended state?
Is the sequence of 
elementary acts correctly 
chosen for the intended 
task?
Are the individual acts 
correctly performed?
DETECTION missing
No
IDENTIFICATION  not correct
No
Yes, the operator 
was activated
Yes, the operator reacts to 
the system state present
No
GOAL not acceptable
Yes,overall goal  (safety 
economy, etc) acceptable
TARGET STATE inappropriate
No
Yes,operator selects 
appropriate system state
TASK inappropriate 
No
Yes,operator selects 
appropriate task
PROCEDURE is incorrect 
No
EXECUTION  is erroneous 
Operator action successful, no event report
Yes, the sequence of 
acts is properly 
controlled
No
Yes
Figure 7. Guide to identification of the internal human malfunction from an event
analysis.
1
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For cases including several inappropriate human decisions which are
related in the chain of events, we normally only classify the first mal-
function when the source of information is routine reports. This is due
to the consideration that the situation following an erroneous decision
is too complex to allow the analyst to judge the basis of the subsequent
decisions and the normal classification categories may not apply. The
variability, e.g., for human decision making, in a situation created by
acts based on mis-identification of the state of the system, is only ac-
cessible through very detailed in situ analyses based on interviews.
A systematic guide to the analysis of simple routine event reports, to
identify "what was wrong", is proposed in fig. 7.
Mechanisms of Human Malfunction
The categories of mechanisms of human malfunction are closely related
to the categories of human behavior which are represented in the model
of fig. 3. The categories of "internal human malfunction" and those of
"mechanisms of human malfunctions", which are related to categories
of internal human information processes and of internal human mech-
anisms, respectively, are basically different concepts and should there-
fore be considered separately during event analysis. During normal
work situations, there is a rather close correlation between information
process types and of mechanisms used for the activity. Since, however,
event analysis will include situations of all degrees of familiarity for op-
erators, we maintain that the categories of information processes and
psychological mechanisms should be kept separate during analysis .
As discussed above, the mechanisms of malfunction must be
deduced from the observable evidence by means of a model of human
performance, and the analysis must therefore follow guidelines derived
from such a model as, for instance, proposed derived from the three
level model of fig. 3. The categories proposed should not be taken as a
final set; it includes the categories which have been found typical from
a preliminary analysis of 200 U.S. Licensee Event Reports (Rasmussen
1980). Since they have been found to cover the larger part of the cases,
an immediate classification as proposed during event recording will
save the effort for detailed data collection in the more complex situa-
tions.
An important situation for which detailed data collection and analysis
are needed, is when operators respond to abnormal situations and have
realized that knowledge-based reasoning is needed. In this knowledge-
based domain there is very little correlation between the activity types
of identification, decision and planning, and the underlying types of
psychological mechanisms related to functional, causal deduction and
search which will be applied in all the activities. In the present
1
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taxonomy, all mechanisms related to this level of behavior are lumped
in the category of malfunction during inference such as inadequate
consideration of causal conditions or side effects. Future studies, e.g. in
training simulator sessions, will hopefully serve to make this category
more detailed, as well as more infrequent categories now lumped in the
category "other". It is therefore important to have good, free text de-
scriptions of cases relating to these two categories.
MECHANISMS OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION: HOW DID IT FAIL?
The situation is a 
routine situation for 
which the operator has 
highly skilled 
routines?
Start
The situation deviates 
from normal routine - 
does operator respond 
to the change?
No
Operator realizes and 
respond to changes. Is  
the situation covered 
by normal work 
know-how or planned 
procedures?
Yes
The situation is 
unique, unknown and 
calls for operators 
functional analysis 
and planning. Does 
operator realize this?
No
Does the operator 
correctly correct the 
information available 
for his analysis?
Yes
Are functional 
analysis and deduction 
properly performed?
Yes
Other, specify
Yes
But the operator 
executes a skilled act 
inappropriately
Yes
The act is not performed with 
adequate precision (time, force, 
spatial accuracy)
The act is performed at wrong 
place, component in spite of 
proper intention
Does other highly skilled acts or 
activities interfere with task?
No
Manual 
variability 
Topographic 
misorientation  
Stereotype 
take-over
Stereotype 
fixation
Does the operator 
realize this? 
Familiar pattern 
not recognized
No
No
Does operator 
respond to 
proper task - 
defining 
information?
Does operator 
recall procedure 
correctly?
Operator 
responds to 
familiar cue 
which is 
incomplete 
part of 
available 
information
Yes Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes, but fails during 
execution
Forget 
isolated 
acts
Mis- 
takes 
alterna-
tives
Other 
slip of 
memory
No
Familiar 
association 
short-cut
Yes
Information not seen or sought
Information assumed, not observed
Information misinterpreted
No
No
Side effects or conditions not 
adequately considered
Figure 8. Guide for event analysis for identification of the psychological mechanisms
leading to malfunction.
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CAUSES OF HUMAN MALFUNCTION: WHY DID IT FAIL?
Do changes,events or
faults in the tecnical
system interfere with
operator´s ongoing 
task? 
Do alarm, signal, 
noise, etc. call for
operator activity? 
Irrelevant sounds or
events distract 
operator from his tas
Distraction from 
system
Do people in the 
system distract 
operator´s attention 
from ongoing task?
Does 
supervisor/colleagu
address operator wit
requirement for new
activity?
Other person distract
operator with 
disturbing message, 
question, telephone 
call, etc.
Does change in
system state or 
task planning led
to excessive task
demand?
Changes in task ca
for excessive: 
- response time 
- manual force
Changes or 
modification call fo
information which
has not been 
given/is not 
available to operato
Changes has bee
foreseen, but 
incorrect 
information has
been given to 
operator
Operator 
incapacitated by
acute cause: 
illness, injury, 
etc.? 
Other external 
cause?
Other, Specify: 
Start
Distraction 
from other 
person
Excessive 
physical 
Excessive demand on 
knowledge/training
Instruction 
incorrect
Operator 
incapacitated
Spontaneous 
human 
variability
Interfering task
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
NoYes
No
Yes No No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Figure 9. Guide for event analysis to identify external causes of human malfunction
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Causes of Human Malfunction
This category should identify the possible external causes of the inap-
propriate human action. As discussed in a previous section, a mal-
function implies a change from normal or expected function and this
change can be due to a spontaneous internal human variability or a
change in the external task condition. Identification of possible external
causes is important for several reasons. First of all, there is a natural
tendency, when analyzing the chain of events implied in mal-operation
of a system, to accept a human error as the explanation if an in-
appropriate human act is met by the causal backtracking "it is human
to err". Special care is therefore needed to identify external causes.
Secondly, such external causes may be important since they influence
frequency and also may indicate causal coupling to other chains of
event.
 The category of causes within the present taxonomy should only be
taken as illustrative. Specific sets should be identified in the different
specific applications since they will be very context dependent. A deci-
sion tree to guide data collection can therefore only be a framework en-
suring consideration of the major classes, such as the one illustrated in
fig. 9.
Performance Shaping and Situation Factors
These categories include general conditions which may influence error
probability, but according to our definition do not cause errors. The
distinction between the two categories is only caused by the fact that
the set here called performance shaping factors can only be identified
by careful human factors analysis, whereas the situation factors are
readily recognizable. The class "task characteristics" is important in
relation to error mechanisms, since it should identify whether the task
is familiar to the person or not, and whether it is performed according
to schedule or not. This information gives clue to identification of the
level of behavior called upon (compare fig. 3).
HUMAN ERROR PREDICTION
In the sections above, references have been made to the use of the tax-
onomy for event analysis and some of the problems involved have been
discussed. Event analysis implies a breakdown of the event into the
features given by the taxonomy, and the quality of the taxonomy is re-
lated to the extent to which the causal flow and the mechanisms con-
trolling the event propagation are maintained and can be regenerated
from the data. When used for error prediction, the taxonomy must serve
a synthesis of the relevant, possible chains of events during human
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performance from the elements contained in the categories together
with an estimate of the probability or at least a ranking of the
significance of the possible events. A discussion of the problems in-
volved in prediction of human errors in general is presented elsewhere
(Rasmussen 1979) and is outside the scope of the present paper and,
accordingly, only an illustrative indication of the use of the taxonomy is
considered.
Stereotype takeover
Motor variability
Spatial misorientation
Excessive task demand
Other
Specified act not performed
Performed incorrectly, too much
Performed incorrectly, too little
Act on wrong object, xx
Forget isolated act
Mistake alternatives
Other slip of memory
Stereotype teke-over
No
?
No
Relevant connections are  
indicated in analysis
Correct task intention 
Procedure available
Cause of  
malfunction
Mechanism of  
malfunction
Required  
function
External mode  
of malfunction
Acts not performed
Incorrect act: other object/direction
Switch to wrong action sequence
Wrong place/object
Wrong object
Lack of precision: lose control, drop tools 
                     too much/little;too soon/late
The  
individual  
act  
properly  
executed?
The se- 
quence  
of acts  
properly  
coordi- 
nated  
with  
proce- 
dure?
Operator incapacitated
No external cause
Yes
Figure 4. The figure illustrates how a error-mode-and-effect analysis tracing the
causal chain through the dimensions of the error taxonomy can serve a detailed
identification of possible extraneous effects of errors in cases where a reliable
representation is available of the work procedure. This is, in particular, the case for
operation of technical equipment.
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Prediction of human malfunction in a task considered in isolation is
not very meaningful. The basis for any human error prediction in the
present context will be the results of a functional analysis of the tech-
nical system or the task environment including a failure analysis. This
analysis will serve to identify the requirements for human actions. It
will specify the required human task in terms of an action sequence re-
quired to bring the system from one normal or disturbed state to an-
other. At the same time, probability estimates for the relevant equip-
ment failures and other non-human caused events will be very useful to
serve as stop rules to prevent search for irrelevant human error mech-
anisms. When the task requirements related to different plant states
are formulated, the problem of prediction is to determine whether the
person will detect the need for action, identify the actual state of the
system, choose the proper target state and so forth in short, the inter-
nal mental functions which are required by the task and could be
wrong should be determined. Next, the internal mechanisms of mal-
function are correlated to the required mental functions and their effect
upon the actual task performance can be determined in detail. This
means that the relevant external modes of failure for the actual task are
identified and the related specific fault trees can be constructed. If we
consider as a simple example the act of closing a valve, this can be
unsuccessful due to different causal mechanisms. It may be opened
fully instead of closed due to a "mistake of alternatives" or due to
"stereotype fixation" (if it operates in reverse to usual). Closing may be
omitted due to simple "slip of memory" with high probability, if the act
is "functionally isolated" from the main course of the task. Or a wrong
valve may be closed, in which case we have two coupled errors and it is
important to predict the mistaken valve. Depending upon the error
mechanism involved, this valve will be topographically close
("topographic mis-orientation"), have a name or label which can be
mistaken ("mistake of alternatives", A for B for instance) or be part of a
very familiar routine which is similar to the present task
(psychologically close, "stereotype take-over"). The message of this sim-
ple example is that the causal relationships among mechanisms, men-
tal function and task elements must be maintained during the analysis
in order to identify the external mode of error and to relate frequencies
or probabilities to the ultimate effects and to predict couplings between
multiple errors. When the ultimate effect of the errors and potential for
error correction are identified from the systems analysis, the probable
causes of errors are estimated to judge error probability and potential
for coupling to other events. Based on the proposed multi-facet taxon-
omy, general formats to guide identification of relevant chains of events
including human error in systems analysis can be formed. An illustra-
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tive example for action errors is shown in figure 10, based on a combi-
nation of the categories of internal malfunction, mechanisms of mal-
function, together with causes and external effects. A practical imple-
mentation of such pre-formatted analysis guides have been developed
by Taylor (1979). Since errors of intention are very complex and situa-
tion specific, such general guides for this kind of error are not feasible
at present. However, error prediction for familiar tasks for which the
procedure is known is an important part of systems reliability analysis
and risk analysis and tools like the action analysis format of fig. 10
have proved useful.
CONCLUSION
In the present paper, it has been stressed several times that the impor-
tant aspect of the proposed taxonomy is the structure, not the elements
used within the various categories. There is, at present, a widespread
interest in quantification of human performance which appears to be
somewhat premature, since the qualitative structures and categories
which are necessary to define the items to be measured or counted are
not properly sorted out. This cannot be done without careful studies of
human performance and errors in actual work situations in order to
reach a better understanding of the complexity of human error
situations and the data needed to characterize them. The purpose of
the present taxonomy has been to contribute to the basis for such
studies by means of more systematic experiments in data collection
schemes for real-life work situations.
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